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Organizational f exibility has recently received much attention from researchers, management 
consultants and practitioners. In general, the term 'flexibility' has a positive connotation: flexible 
organizations are the better ones. However, the meaning of flexibility as well as its relation to the 
functioning of an organization is still ambiguous. This article develops a systematic and 
multidimensional picture of flexibility on the basis of views taken from the systems theory of control. 
The general idea is that flexibility can be analysed as a characteristic ofsome dual and relative control 
relation between the organization and its environment, which fosters organizational independence. It 
is argued that flexibility is a function of the control capability of the management as well as the 
controllability of the organization. Flexibility is thus concerned with the promotion of the 
management's control capability or competence. The management's ability to allocate and use this 
capacity with success, however, is dependent upon organizational conditions that determine the 
controllability. The organization design task, therefore, involves the creation of appropriate 
organizational conditions to foster flexibility. This article clarifies the paradoxical nature of flexibility 
and the existence of different ypes of flexibility. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd 
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INTRODUCTION 
ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY has recently once 
more recieved much attention from researchers, 
management consultants and practitioners. 
Intuition would suggest that organizational 
flexibility, which roughly means mobility, 
responsiveness, agility, suppleness or litheness, 
is important and desirable. Yet intuitive 
understanding alone is not a solid enough basis 
for analysis and design. Nearly 20 years ago, 
Steers [48] demonstrated, on the basis of 
seventeen organizational effectiveness studies, 
that flexibility was the evaluation criterion 
mentioned most frequently. However, the added 
value of the construct to the theory and practice 
of management is in many cases very restricted 
[52, 53]. We may rightfully ask ourselves if 
flexibility is used as a magic word or belongs to 
a new business fad [26]. What does flexibility 
really mean? Is flexibility required by every 
organization as some new 'one best way'? What 
makes organizations flexible? In contrast with 
the importance of such questions, the meaning 
of flexibility and its relation to the functioning 
of an organization is still ambiguous. A critical 
and unbiased approach is lacking. In this article, 
we will contribute to such an approach by 
developing a clearer and more encompassing 
concept of flexibility. 
We wish to make clear that our approach 
takes a specific functionalistic and systems 
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theoretical stand; we aim to contribute to 
methods of analysis and the improvement of 
organizational functioning. In short, we will 
look at organizations from a functionalistic 
perspective [10]. 
Our analysis tarted with the intuitive idea of 
flexibility as an important aspect of a dual and 
relative control relation between the organiz- 
ation and its environment: flexible organizations 
are open systems but they are not puppets in the 
hands of their environments. They are able to 
free themselves, to some extent, from environ- 
mental control. This intuitive idea led quite 
naturally to the choice of the systems theory of 
control as one of the conceptual theories for 
analysing flexibility. Among other things, this 
theory enables us to analyse to what extent 
control is possible and which factors determine 
or impede its success. We will show that, from 
this perspective, two questions have to be 
answered: "What makes an organization uncon- 
trollable from the environment?" and "What 
makes an organization powerful in controlling 
its environment?" 
In the next section we shall start with the 
clarification of some main ideas from this 
systems theory of control. We will then 
gradually develop our concept of flexibility and 
will finally show that flexibility is a multidimen- 
sional concept of a paradoxical nature related to 
stability. Flexibility is not only a management 
task but is also a task of organization design. 
Among other things, it will be argued that 
different sets of specific circumstances ask for 
different ypes of flexibility. 
SYSTEMS THEORY OF CONTROL: 
ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND 
UNDERLYING PARADIGM 
The use of systems theory in order to define 
the concept of flexibility may lead to misunder- 
standing, because there are many different 
~The philosophical systems movement presupposes that 
organizations are systemic innature, while the organic 
systems movement assumes that organizations are living 
organisms which strive for survival, growth, and 
exchange ofmaterial with the surrounding environment. 
For a more elaborate discussion, see De Leeuw [15, 
pp. 63-65]. 
2For a more elaborate discussion ofthe systems theory of 
control and some of its central concepts we refer to, for 
instance, several of the works of De Leeuw [14-17], 
Kickert and Van Gigh [27] and Beer [9]. 
systems approaches [23]. The systems theory of 
control is part of the conceptual systems 
approach [15, pp. 63-68], which may be seen in 
the tradition of the conceptual and methodo- 
logical views of Ackoff [3, 4], Ashby's foun- 
dations of cybernetics [8], and the ideas of 
self-organization and 'autopoiesis' of, for 
example, Varela [22, 32]. In contrast with 
philosophical nd organic systems approaches, ~ 
the conceptual systems approach is not an 
empirical theory or model but rather a 
methodology [23]. Snow [47], working along the 
lines of Ackoff, argues that system theory may 
even bridge the gap between the functionalistic 
and interpretative approaches in organization 
theory. 
According to De Leeuw [15, p. 66], the 
conceptual systems approach offers various 
systems concepts and modes of thought in terms 
of instruments and tools for application in 
real-life situations. It is, so to speak, a modelling 
tool-box that we will use for modelling 
organizational flexibility. The most fundamen- 
tal decision when applying systems theory then 
is the making of distinctions, the very act of 
defining the system concerned, of distinguishing 
it from its environment. Kickert [26, p. 485] 
concludes that the advantage of this conceptual 
approach to organizational f exibility is that 
concepts are abstract and empirically vacuous, 
and accordingly less limited to their area of 
application, while in addition they are not vague 
but unequivocal. 
On the other hand, De Leeuw [15, p. 64] 
rightly notices that this abstract nature also 
brings with it some major problems. The 
conceptual systems approach demands much 
practice and experience in modelling systems. 
In this article, the concepts of the systems 
theory of control are only defined roughly as a 
reminder, for they are defined thoroughly 
elsewhere. 2 Although it is possible to state very 
precise mathematical definitions in connection 
with the systems theory of control, we will only 
use relatively simple concepts and omit any 
unnecessarily complicated mathematics. 
The paradigm of control 
At the heart of the systems theory of control 
there is the paradigm of control: a set of 
concepts for looking at and analysing parts of 
reality. Of course, a central concept is 'control'. 
The problem with the word control is that it can 
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easily be misunderstood as tied to the classical 
hierarchical mode of management, which is not 
implied by the specific meaning of the word 
control in this theory. In the same way, our 
concept of control does not have the meaning of 
close monitoring and regular checks that it has 
in the field of accounting. Comparable risks of 
misunderstanding arise when using other verbs 
such as steering and regulating. 
The systems theory of control originates from 
a general definition of control: any manner of 
directed influence a [14, 16]. We may recall that 
originators of cybernetics like Wiener and 
Ashby never thought of control in the sense of 
a strict determination of processes. The label 
'control' and its use to describe aspects of an 
organization depends on the viewpoint of the 
observer explaining phenomena s such. There 
is not a definitional need for the success of this 
directed influence. As we all know, much 
control is not successful, and can even be 
counterproductive. The idea of control is thus 
not defined by its success but by the ascribed 
intention. 
This paradigm clearly enables us to recog- 
nize that the function of management (as a 
process) is to control in terms of producing 
directed influence. Nonetheless, it also allows 
for the analysis of reasons for not being 
successful, as a result of, for example, the 
limited predictability, the active and reactive 
nature of organizational reality and the 
non-linearity of circles of influence. The theory 
enables us to analyse situations involving the 
so-called illusion of control: even control that 
is not successful at all is nevertheless called 
control. As has been said before, it must not be 
confused with an absolute concept of control 
that leaves no room for the controlled system. 
The relative concept of control facilitates its 
application for the analysis of a huge variety of 
forms of directed influence, such as power 
3We seriously thought about introducing a new word, for 
example dinfluencing (from directed influencing) for the 
concept but eventually dropped this idea. Probably the 
medicine would be worse than the disease. 
4In systems theory the concept partsystem is the more 
general term [14, 15]. Three types of partsystem can be 
derived from any original system: a subsystem takes 
some of the elements from the original system, an 
aspectsystem concentrates on some of the relations of 
the original system, and, finally, a phase-system takes 
only part of the original time slice into consideration. 
processes, teaching, trying to convince, organ- 
izational improvement, learning, governing, 
and so on. This relativity matches reality much 
more than, for instance, outstanding managers, 
administrators, and consultants are aware; they 
all strive for some successful influence on what 
they feel responsible for, but nevertheless 
realize that the effect of this influence is limited 
in principle. 
Thus the concept of control is a relative one 
because of (1) the explicit distinction between 
the intentions of control as direct influence and 
the effect of this influencing, (2) the recognition 
of the discrepancies between these two, and, 
finally, (3) the definition of an observed activity 
as control is an act of an observer trying to 
grasp some aspects of reality. 
The abstract nature of this concept of control 
does not imply the acceptance of some 
discernable subsystem: the controller. To be 
more specific, the process of management 
cannot be equated with the activities of the 
manager. While in many situations managers do 
indeed dominate this process, in principle every 
organizational member participates in it. The 
control system of an organization, therefore, is
not by definition located in a subsystem. It has 
to be found in a partsystem, 4 the relation of 
which to the system as a whole varies greatly 
with the type of organization. This partsystem 
might be a subsystem that is identical to the 
managerial subsystem. In such a case of 
extrinsic control, control is exerted by some 
(authoritarian) manager(s). The partsystem 
might also be an aspectsystem, for instance, 
when separate groups have self-control. In this 
situation, there is not a separate control system 
as a subsystem, but the control is produced by 
a specific bundle of relations between the 
members of the group. This type of control is 
called intrinsic control. Control might also be an 
emergent property: control resulting from the 
interactions. In contrast with extrinsic ontrol, 
intrinsic control refers to more democratic and 
more participative forms of decision-making in 
organizations, which may be explicitly designed 
but may also emerge out of a process of 
interaction. According to Weick [55, p. 8], such 
control is often disrupted by managerial 
meddling. Management intervenes in the mis- 
taken belief that single individuals do the 
controlling, denying that control may be 
produced implicitly in causal circuits and 
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interpersonal influence processes. Failure to 
acknowledge these forms of self-control, 
coupled with interventions that actively disrupt 
these self-regulating activities, are the occasions 
for much mismanagement i  organizations. 
In addition to this structural type of intrinsic 
control, we can distinguish an ideological type of 
intrinsic control [12, 17]. A shared ideology may 
solve many problems of control by specifying 
broad, tacitly understood rules for appropriate 
action under unspecified contingencies. For 
instance, Mintzberg connects ideological control 
to his concept of the missionary organization 
[33] and the ideological strategy [34]. In both 
these concepts, control is produced by a shared 
ideology that offers organizational members an 
attractive identity as well as convincing in- 
terpretations of reality. Furthermore, there is no 
need for conscious actions taken by the 
controller. In connection with this, Adam 
Smith's invisible hand may indeed be considered 
as such an abstract intrinsic controller eferring 
to a bundle of relations that form the market 
producing the coordination. To give a final 
example of the broadness of the concept, it also 
embraces everal types of control Weick [57] 
distinguishes in his theory of "organization 
redesign as improvisation", such as "control by 
paradigm" and "control by enacted stability". 
We wish to note that from the point of view 
of systems theory, intrinsic control is not 
necessarily superior to extrinsic control: this 
depends, among other things, upon the goals 
and circumstances. To take an organizational 
example of intrinsic ontrol which can be judged 
negatively, one can imagine a situation in which 
organizational members are all prisoners of the 
bundle of relations that tie them together. In the 
same way, an organization can also be a mental 
prison [36] if the culture hampers seeing 
important changes in the market. Thus, in terms 
of control, culture is then an intrinsic controller 
that effectively controls the organization with 
respect o the preservation of ways of thinking 
that may become outdated over time. 
Finally the abstract nature of control enables 
an individual, or individuals, to change roles 
between being the controller and being the 
5We refrain from further analysing power relations, 
although this would be illustrative of the theory. The 
simple reason is that it would take such a large amount 
of space that the main ideas of looking at flexibility as 
dual control would be obscured. 
controlled, a fact which offers us a possibility to 
model the idea of dual or reciprocal control that 
we take as a fundamental key for analysing 
flexibility. 
MODELLING DUAL CONTROL: 
THE CONTROLLING ORGAN-TARGET 
SYSTEM GAME 
In order to take the idea of dual control 
further, we can use one of the main concepts of 
the system theory of control: the so-called 
controlling organ (CO) target system (TS) 
modelling game. The COTS game offers a 
framework to facilitate the analysis of organiz- 
ational phenomena from several contrasting or 
even conflicting points of view. It is called a 
game because of the need to use the framework 
in a creative and playful way in order to provide 
this facilitation. This CO-TS game explicitly 
forces researchers and managers to look at 
organizations from a variety of angles, as net- 
works of COs and TSs. As a general modelling 
rule of the game, whenever a partsystem, A, is 
seen as a CO and another is seen as TS, B, being 
controlled, one must also model the reversed 
picture in which B is seen as the CO and A as the 
TS. This multiform framework avoids the 
mono-paradigmatic mechanistic and one-sided 
images of the organization, as, unfortunately, is 
often the case with approaches derived from 
traditional systems and control theory. For 
example, it is no longer beyond the scope of the 
systems theory of control to analyse power 
relations. As is well-known, most theories view 
power relations as dual relations: the power of A 
over B and the power of B over A. Both have to 
be analysed, which is perfectly in accordance 
with the CO-TS game. 5
To elucidate the multiple frames of this game 
for creative modelling, we should recall that the 
most fundamental decision in applying systems 
theory is the act of defining the system 
concerned, thus distinguishing it from its 
environment. The establishment of these system 
boundaries is inescapably associated with a 
certain cognitive point of view; i.e. a particular 
set of presuppositions and attitudes, a perspec- 
tive, or a frame. According to Goguen and 
Varela [22], one may choose to focus one's 
attention (cognitive point of view, frame) either 
on the system's environment, taking the 
system's properties as given, or else on the 
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internal constitution of the system. In other 
words, in line with the CO-TS game, we can 
think of an organization as a controlled system 
and as an autonomous ystem, thus capturing 
the idea of dual control that we believe to be 
central to flexibility. As we will see, this leads to 
understanding different ypes of flexibility. 
The organization as a controlled system 
Modelling the organization as a controlled or 
target system, the observer chooses to pay 
attention to the environment, treating the 
system as a simple entity with given properties 
and seeking the regularities of its interaction 
with the environment; i.e. the constraints on the 
behaviour of the system imposed by its 
environment (see Fig. 1). This leads naturally to 
the problem of controlling the behaviour of the 
system, as considered in the traditional systems 
theory sometimes called Cybernetics I.
Cybernetics I has been developed extensively 
as a result of the study of man-made systems 
(such as engineering and computer systems), 
whereas the insights derived from natural 
systems have remained by and large much less 
formally developed. From the viewpoint of 
Cybernetics I, organizations are seen as open 
systems, which is a result of attempts to make 
sense of such systems from the standpoint of an 
external observer. These open systems are in 
constant interaction with their environment, 
transforming inputs into outputs as a means of 
creating the conditions necessary for survival 
[36, p. 236]. Fluctuations in their environment 
are viewed as challenges to which the organiz- 
ation must respond. This is the classical idea of 
adapting. In this context, fluctuations are 
viewed as equilibrium-disturbing. Therefore, for 
a system to remain stable, it is believed that 
fluctuations must be minimized [46, p. 273]. 
system 
$ 
environment 
* - cognitive viewpoint or 
observer 
~" - f low of signals and 
interactions 
Fig. 2. The organization as an autonomous system. 
The organization as an autonomous system 
The CO-TS game demands that the reverse 
stand is also taken. An observer may choose to 
focus on the internal structure of the system, 
viewing the environment as background; e.g. as 
a source of perturbations of the system's 
autonomous behaviour (see Fig. 2). From this 
viewpoint, sometimes called Cybernetics II, the 
properties of the system emerge from the 
interactions of its components. In other words, 
environmental influences become perturbations 
which are compensated for through the 
underlying recursive interdependence of the 
system's components. This perspective of 
autonomous systems also challenges the validity 
of absolute distinctions between a system and its 
environment that underlie Cybernetics I.
The notion of autonomy is particularly 
important for natural systems, for example 
biological and social systems, and the lack of a 
well-developed theory of autonomous systems is 
felt to be a serious problem. 
"An engineer designing an artefact will choose the inputs of 
interest to him for this application with some assurance that 
the choice will be adequate. But a biologist studying a cell 
is forced to acknowledge the autonomy of the cell; if the 
biologist's preferences for input and output variables do not 
match the cell's internal organization, the biologist's theory 
will not work" [22, p. 35]. 
environment 
+ 
system 
Fig. 1. The orgamzation 
* - cognitive viewpoint or 
observer 
$ = f low of signals and 
interactions 
as a controlled system. 
Some researchers, however, in particular 
Maturana and Varela [32], offer a new 
perspective for understanding the logic through 
which living systems change, which is the 
foundation of Cybernetics II [36]. In this theory, 
all living systems are organizationally auton- 
omous systems of interaction that make 
reference only to themselves. Maturana and 
Varela have coined the term autopoiesis to refer 
to this capacity for self-production through a 
closed system of relations. However, they 
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developed their theory primarily as a new 
interpretation of biological phenomena, and 
they have strong reservations about applying it 
to the social world. Accordingly, the research 
literature concerning Cybernetics II suggests 
that there is a difference between naturally 
occurring autopoietic structures and those of 
social entities. Maturana and Varela therefore 
propose the use of 'autonomy' instead of 
'autopoiesis' as the proper term for referring to 
the identity-preserving capability of 'social 
organizations'? 
Autonomous organizations strive to maintain 
their identity by subordinating all changes to the 
maintenance of their own organization as a 
given set of relations [32, pp. 80-81]. They do so 
by engaging in circular patterns of interaction 
whereby change in one element of the system is 
coupled with changes elsewhere, setting up 
continuous patterns of interaction that are 
always self-referential. This implies that a 
system's interaction with its environment is a 
reflection of and part of its own organization. 
Consequently, the system cannot enter into 
interactions that are not specified in the pattern 
of relations that define its organization. This 
so-called 'organizational closure' does not mean 
that an autonomous system is completely 
isolated in the sense that it has no environment, 
but that the relations with any environment are 
internally determined; its environment is really 
defined by, and in some sense is even a part of, 
itself. 
If autonomous organizations are geared to 
maintaining their own identity, and if relations 
with the environment are internally determined, 
then systems can evolve and change only along 
with self-generated changes in identity. There- 
fore, in Cybernetics II, attention is drawn to 
system processes that try to maintain identity by 
ignoring or counteracting threatening fluctu- 
ations, and to the way variations can lead to the 
emergence of new modes of organization. 
Random changes can trigger circular inter- 
actions, the final consequences of which are 
determined by whether or not the current 
6Furthermore, Morgan [36] remarks that, used as a 
metaphor, the theory of autopoiesis has intriguing 
implications for our understanding of organizations. 
7Smith [46, p. 273] perfectly illustrates this concept of "order 
through fluctuation" by considering the predator-prey 
relationship of lynxes and rabbits. 
identity of the system will dampen the effects of 
the new disturbance through compensatory 
changes elsewhere, or whether a new configur- 
ation of relations will be allowed to emerge. In 
this context, fluctuation is viewed as a major 
vehicle for creating order, not for destroying it. 7 
For instance, the theory of dissipative structures 
founded by Prigogine [39] suggests that near- 
equilibrium order is destroyed, whereas 
far-from-equilibrium order is maintained. Ac- 
cording to Smith [46, p. 275], autonomous 
systems trive for resilience instead of stability. 
Resilience may be viewed as a measure of the 
persistence of a system and its ability to absorb 
change and disturbance and still maintain the 
same relationship with other entities within its 
environment. It is therefore possible to think of 
an autonomous system becoming more unstable 
as a result of large fluctuations, but knowing 
how to survive with these fluctuations makes for 
greater esilience in that many changes can be 
absorbed. 
It will become clear later that this concept of 
an autonomous ystem in the sense of the 
autopoietic system leads to a different idea of 
flexibility than that arrived at through the 
concept of Cybernetics I.
Organizations: controlled and autonomous 
systems 
In summary, organizations can be considered 
from different points of view, namely as 
controlled or as autonomous ystems, each 
leading to different ypes of flexibility. It is not 
our intention to join these various perspectives 
together in a single theory. Goguen and Varela 
[22, p. 36] argue that these views are 
complementary, in the sense of contributing to 
a better understanding of natural systems. 
The CO-TS game offers a frame within which 
these various preferred views on systems can be 
unified. Playing this game further we shall 
obtain a number of different CO-TS configur- 
ations on which to base our concept of 
flexibility. Therefore, the examination of the 
organization as a controlled and as an 
autonomous ystem will be undertaken. For 
each configuration, flexibility is defined in terms 
of properties of control. In particular, it is 
argued that organizational flexibility makes an 
organization uncontrollable from its environ- 
ment and/or powerful in controlling its environ- 
ment. 
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In the following first round of this COTS 
game, we will deal more explicitly with 
organizational flexibility in relation to control. 
By further analysing the standard COTS 
model, we will clarify how flexibility contributes 
to control. This exercise helps us to define 
flexibility as a two-dimensional concept, namely 
as a function of the control capability of the 
management and of the controllability of the 
organization. When flexibility is seen as a 
management task the concern is with the quality 
of the control capacity of the management; 
when it is seen as an organizational design task 
the concern is with the controllability of the 
organization and the environment under differ- 
ent conditions. 
Subsequently, in the second round of the 
CO-TS game, these management and organiz- 
ational design tasks will be examined further. 
This will finally result in a systematic and 
multidimensional picture of flexibility. 
FLEXIBILITY FROM DIFFERENT CONTROL 
PERSPECTIVES: THE FIRST ROUND OF THE 
COTS GAME 
In this first round we shall explore an 
organization as a controlled and as an 
autonomous ystem. Each configuration has 
different implications for flexibility. 
The organization as a controlled system 
To begin with, the organization is considered 
as a controlled system. In other words, the 
environment is defined as a controlling organ 
and the organization as a target system. As 
such, the organization must find a means of 
resisting the threat of incorporation by its 
immediate environment, and the consequent 
loss of distinctiveness [35, p. 28]. If the 
environment can directly force the organization 
in a certain direction, regardless of the presence 
of organizational controls, the organization 
may become adrift) Hence, the organization 
seeks a degree of freedom from environmental 
Sin his typology of various organizational strategies, 
Mintzberg [34, p. 268] has called this an imposed 
strategy. These strategies originate in the environment. 
The environment dictates patterns in actions either 
through direct imposition or through implicitly pre- 
empting organizational choice. 
influence [6, 11, 18]. As a result, the organiz- 
ation adapts in such a way that it remains 
essentially the same, despite changes in the 
environment [17]. 
In this configuration, flexibility stands for 
insensibility to control from the environment. 
Or, in more specific terms, high flexibility 
corresponds with low controllability from the 
environment. Low controllability implies that 
the target system, in this case the organization, 
cannot be directed by the environment towards 
the desired set of states. The organization is not 
a puppet in the hands of its environment. One 
might think of it as being elusive. We have an 
internal type of flexibility here, which is often 
activated in response to environmental change; 
i.e. whenever the environment exercises control 
over the organization it is able to adapt in such 
a way that this control does not succeed: the 
environment loses hold. 
The organization as an autonomous  system 
Using the turn-around rule of the game, we 
shall now consider the organization as an 
autonomous ystem; i.e. the organization is 
defined as a controlling organ and the 
environment as a target system. In this 
configuration the organization tries to influence 
the environment. In order to produce directed 
influence upon its environment, the organiz- 
ation needs to possess some dominance. 
Flexibility then means the ability to successfully 
control the environment, or, in common 
language, to manipulate the environment. In 
more specific terms, high flexibility corresponds 
with an extensive control capacity of the 
organization with respect to the environment. 
We have an external type of flexibility here 
which can be passive or active: with or with- 
out a trigger from the environment, the 
organization is able to take successful initiatives 
in directing the environment owards states 
that are favourable for the organization. 
Table 1. Organizational flexibility considered from different 
configurations of control 
Perspective of control: the organization as 
Controlled system Autonomous system 
Seeking autonomy Seeking dominance 
Adapting by remaining partly itself Producing directed influence 
upon its environment 
Internal flexibility External flexibility 
Passive or active Passive or active 
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CO 
u ~ D (u) 
eeE  
y~G 
information (i) 
environmental (e) 
disturbances 
TS 
~nt~lp~(u)  
output (y) 
Fig. 3. A standard CO-TS model. 
The two configurations explained above and 
their implications for organizational flexibility 
are summarized in Table 1. 
So far we have seen that the use of a control 
perspective r sults very naturally in a distinction 
between internal and external flexibility (pro- 
ducing changes in the organization or in the 
environment). Subsequently, we might argue 
that each of these types can be further 
subdivided into passive and active types 
(behaving with or without a trigger). As a result, 
four types of flexibility emerge: 
--passive internal: ability to generate ffective 
internal changes in response to environ- 
mental changes (e.g. changing the existing 
structure itself in a simple way when this 
proves to be necessary); 
--active internal: ability to generate internal 
changes that are favourable without being 
first triggered by the environment (e.g. 
investments in underused assets such as 
increasing the liquidity of assets, using 
general-purpose facilities and equipment, 
maintaining extra R&D capability or using 
inventories as a buffering mechanism); 
--passive external: ability to restore external 
changes (e.g. developing a product-market 
posture which is sufficiently diversified to 
minimize the effect of a change in demand); 
--active external: ability of the organization's 
own initiative to control the environment in
an effective way (e.g. putting the firm into 
areas in which it can benefit from likely 
breakthroughs). 
OFor a further elaboration fvarious types of flexibility on 
the basis of the systems theory of control, we refer to 
Volberda [52, pp. 117-128]. 
The above distinctions of types of flexibility 
can indeed be found in the relevant likerature. 
For instance, passive and active external 
flexibility correspond with Ansoff's [7] defensive 
and offensive external flexibility. Moreover, 
passive and active internal flexibility are 
considered by Reichwald and Behrbohm [42] in 
terms of reactive and anticipative flexibility. 
However, the systems theory of control clearly 
illustrates that both internal and external 
flexibility can be either passive or active. This 
eradicates a great deal of the ambiguity in the 
literature concerning active and passive flexi- 
bility. A further elaboration of types of 
flexibility might be useful here but at the same 
time might result in complexity that is 
unnecessary at this point and that may even 
obscure the argument2 
In the remainder of this article, we will limit 
ourselves to a further exploration of some aspects 
of the two configurations that have been intro- 
duced here, which will gradually result in an 
integralconcept of flexibility. In particular, we will 
explore the two questions previously formulated, 
namely "What makes an organization uncon- 
trollable from the environment?" and "What 
makes an organization powerful in controlling its 
environment?" To answer these questions we 
need a better understanding of how flexibility 
contributes to solving problems of control. 
FLEXIBILITY IN TERMS OF PROPERTIES 
OF CONTROL 
A problem of control can be represented asa 
standard CO-TS model; i.e. an organization 
consisting of a configuration of a CO and a TS 
which is positioned in a certain environment. In
this configuration, as portrayed in Fig. 3, the 
solvability of the control problem is determined 
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by the control procedures, the controllability of 
the TS, and the control capability of the CO. 
A specification of the control problem 
In order to solve this problem of control we 
must first start with a specification of the control 
problem [15, p. 118]. This involves: 
(i) a specification of the system to be 
controlled (TS), which requires ome modelling 
decisions regarding the system in question, such 
as the establishment of system boundaries, the 
choice of the appropriate l vel(s) of aggregation, 
or the partsystem to be considered; 
(ii) a specification of the goals strived for, 
or at least some evaluation mechanism 
(e.g. suppose that only certain outputs y within 
a desired class G are acceptable); 
(iii) a specification of the environmental 
circumstances (e.g. suppose that the environ- 
mental disturbances e will be limited to 
influences within a class E). 
On the basis of the specification of this 
problem of control, it is clear that flexibility is 
always relative to the goal strived for and the 
environmental circumstances. One might gener- 
alize this idea by defining flexibility as relative to 
a class of goals (G) and a class of environments 
(E). A system is flexible if it can attain any of the 
class of goals in any of the environments from 
the class E. The relativity, however, remains. 
This confirms the intuitive feeling that absolute 
flexibility is nonsense. According to Smith [45, 
p. 321], this notion implies that the meaning of 
flexibility does not lie within the behaviour itself, 
for otherwise its meaning would remain 
constant across time, situations, and levels of 
analysis. As was illustrated in the above CO-TS 
game, the meaning of flexibility changes 
depending on the context and on whose system 
of attribution we are talking about. Organiz- 
ational flexibility, therefore, is not a character- 
istic of an organization itself. Rather, in line 
with Smith's argument, it is a characteristic of 
the relationship between an organization and its 
environment, even though it may be expressed 
or made visible in the actual behaviour of an 
organization. From a practical stand, the 
relativity of flexibility leads to a very natural 
linkage between flexibility, organizational strat- 
egy and environment, which is indeed recog- 
nized in some definitions of flexibility (e.g. 
[2, 28, 40, 411). 
Following on from this specification, we have 
to estimate the solvability of the problem of 
control. We should restate that, regarding the 
solution of this problem of control, both the 
controllability of the TS and the control 
capability of the CO must be considered. 
Controllability of the target system 
Controllability is the possibility of reaching 
the goals G with the TS, irrespective of 
disturbances e from the environment E. 
Therefore, a more precise definition calls a 
system TS [G,E] controllable if for every e from 
E there is a control procedure u from the 
available set D(u) so that output y belongs to 
the desired set G. In further efinements ime is 
taken into account. Controllability, then, is 
concerned with the possibility of directing the 
TS from some arbitrary state to a desired state 
within some time period T irrespective of 
environmental disturbances. We then call a TS 
[G,E,T] controllable. Even more precise defi- 
nitions take into account a specified set of 
beginning states S from which a desired state 
can be reached. This leads to the most complex 
definition: a TS is called [G,E,S,T] controllable 
if, for every beginning state s from S and 
irrespective of disturbances  from E within time 
T, the goal G can be reached. 
The link with organizational flexibility is 
quite simple. Roughly, flexibility increases with 
the increase of E, G or S and with decreasing T. 
The result of this analysis corresponds with 
common ideas about flexibility that have now 
been more systematically generated. An organ- 
ization is more flexible if it can reach its goals 
in a larger set of environments. It can, so to 
speak, survive in different environments. It is 
more flexible if it can realize several goals from 
a larger set, if it is able to reach its goals starting 
from a larger set of initial states, and, finally, if 
it reaches its goals sooner. 
Control capability of the controlling organ 
Aside from the controllability, the other 
factor determining the effect of control is of 
course the control capability of the controlling 
organ CO. The control capability is the ability 
of a CO to get the maximum of a TS; i.e. really 
using a TS to its full controllability potential. It 
is important o recall that we defined control- 
lability as an absolute property of a TS. 
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Controllability is thus independent of the 
properties of the controller. It may be helpful to 
draw an analogy with a car and a driver. The 
controllability of the car consists of properties 
such as road-holding and manoeuvrability. 
These are independent of the properties of the 
driver. In other words, they are defined with 
respect o a perfect driver. By contrast, control 
capability is a property of a CO. Similarly, one 
can speak of good drivers without referring to 
a specific car. Looking at the control capability 
more fundamentally, one realizes that theoreti- 
cally it would be more correct o define control 
capability in relation to a class of TS. However, 
in view of the aim of this article, we will 
abandon that exercise. Although in any real 
situation CO and TS are indeed interrelated, the 
analytical distinction is essential. 
When the control capability fails, one does 
not get the maximum from a certain TS. The 
controllability refers to the absolute boundary 
of some TS which can only be realized by a CO 
with sufficient control capacity. When there is a 
shortage of control capacity, this may result, for 
instance, in not reaching the goal for some 
elements from E or S, and also in taking a 
longer required time to reach the goal. 
The theory of control gives us some insights 
into the question of what determines control 
capability. Among other things, these are the 
requirements for effective control [15, 16], in 
particular those that have not yet been 
mentioned in the definition of controllability, 
namely: 
(iv) the quality of the model; the model must 
incorporate the relationships between environ- 
mental disturbances, control actions and the 
resulting outputs. Or, in a mathematical 
formulation, the controller must search for an 
adequate function f in  y = fie,u). The higher the 
quality, the better the effect of a control 
procedure can be predicted, which facilitates the 
search for an effective measure; 
(v) the set of control procedures; the set D(u) 
of the controller must be larger than, or equal 
to, the set of disturbances e within E. This is 
Ashby's [8] law of requisite variety; 
(vi) the capacity of dealing with information 
must be large enough; according to Conant [13], 
a student of Ashby, some of this capacity is 
wasted on noise (In), on blocking irrelevant data 
(I0, and on coordination (It). In a case where 
there are many interfaces within the CO 
together with a large amount of incoming 
irrelevant data, the net information-handling 
capacity (I, ot) is strongly reduced; i.e. 
I,c, = I,o~ - I, - Ib -- Ic. Ino, is the maximum 
capacity the controller can deal with. 
We should repeat hat these requirements for 
effective control are necessary but not sufficient: 
a lack of controllability of the TS cannot be 
overcome by better control capabilities. More- 
over, the requirements do not in general 
counterbalance each other. For instance, a 
shortage in capacity for handling information 
cannot be compensated by an overkill in 
procedures for control, and vice versa. Still, there 
are some exceptions if one incorporates time. For 
instance, the predictive capabilities of the CO 
(which are determined by the quality of the 
model, the capacity of sensing information from 
the environment, and the information-handling 
capacity) might enable it to adopt successful 
procedures early enough, whilst, if left any later, 
the set of control procedures would have been 
insufficient. This corresponds to the old Dutch 
proverb "I f  one is not strong one has to be smart" 
or "Necessity is the mother of invention". 
Incidentally, the fact that many of the abstract 
conceptual issues discussed above are found in 
common wisdom, especially in proverbs, ensures 
that we have not lost contact with reality. 
Flexibility and control 
The relations between control and flexibility 
following from this exploration of the COTS 
game are simple:flexibility corresponds with high 
controllability and large or at least sufficient 
control capability. Therefore, the resulting 
flexibility of a CO-TS configuration is the 
minimum of controllability and control capa- 
bility. In terms of the analogy of the car: the 
flexibility of a car~lriver combination is the 
minimum of the steering capacities of the driver 
and the control properties of the car. Aspects 
such as the state of the road and the weather are 
also present; they are some of the environmental 
circumstances. So flexibility is a function of two 
sets of variables and not, as is sometimes 
suggested, a function of one of the two. In terms 
of management and organization, flexibility is a 
function of the control capability of the 
management and the changeability of the 
organization. They cannot be counterbalanced: 
e.g. a too restricted changeability of the 
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organization cannot be compensated by the 
extra effort of the management. 
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEFINITION OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
As a result of the above-mentioned consider- 
ations, we found that flexibility has to be treated 
as a two-dimensional concept; i.e. there are two 
distinct and equally important challenges to be 
met if flexibility is to succeed (see Fig. 4). First, 
flexibility is seen as a management task. In this 
respect, the concern is with the quality of the 
'control capacity' or the competence of the 
management. Second, flexibility is seen as an 
organization design task. The concern here is 
with the 'controllability' of the organization and 
the environment which involves the creation of 
the right organizational conditions to foster 
flexibility: is it possible to implement different 
types of flexibility within the organizational 
context? These two dimensions result in the 
following definition [52-54]: 
Flexibility is the degree to which an organiz- 
ation possesses a variety of actual and potential 
procedures, and the rapidity by which it can 
'°Other equirements are interesting too: e.g. the require- 
ment of a model tells us that the managerial dimension 
of flexibility is bound by the quality of the model 
management has of its organization a d its environment. 
In short, no flexibility without real insight. 
implement these procedures, in order to increase 
the control capability of the management and 
improve the controllability of the organization 
and the environment. 
This seemingly complex definition is ex- 
plained below. 
The management task 
As a continuous management task, flexibility 
is concerned with the creation or promotion of 
the management's control capacity, especially in 
situations of unexpected disturbance. This 
management task must be fulfilled in order to 
prevent a threatening uncontrollability of the 
organization. Restraining ourselves to some of 
the requirements for effective controP ° we take 
as core components of this management task: 
(i) the existence of actual and potential 
procedures of management; not only the actual 
range of procedures i important, but also the 
range of potential procedures, which have not 
yet been activated. Actual procedures have 
already been allocated to a real flexibility-need 
[42]. The possible mergence of opportunities or 
threats, however, requires management to have 
some potential procedures to rely upon as an 
insurance against risk [43]. 
(ii) the variety of procedures of management; 
Ashby [8] demonstrated that the required 
variety of procedures activated by the manage- 
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ment within the organization must be minimally 
equal to the variety of disturbances within the 
environment. This is the 'Law of Requisite 
Variety': variety in the environment can only be 
absorbed by variety in the organization. The 
variety of procedures of the organization has to 
be equated with the extent of disorder within the 
environment which the management wishes to 
control. In many organizations, the manage- 
ment reduces the perceptible variety in the 
environment to below the threshold level of 
required response by using various reduction 
mechanisms, uch as standardization, formal- 
ization and complex planning systems [9]. 
Consequently, the repertoire of control pro- 
cedures and the controllability of the organiz- 
ation are strongly diminished. In a turbulent 
environment, however, the management has to 
possess a large variety of procedures; in other 
words, an extensive collection of flexibility- 
increasing procedures in order to control the 
organization and its environment. This large 
variety of procedures of management can be in 
terms of either the quantity (the number of 
procedures) or the quality of the procedures 
(such as one-off versus durable flexibility-in- 
creasing procedures). For instance, the training 
of multi-skilled personnel results in a more 
durable mode of flexibility, while the contract- 
ing out of certain peripheral activities or 'hire 
and fire' employment practices tend to result in 
a one-off improvement in flexibility. One-off 
flexibility-increasing procedures lead to a 
reduction of the potential for use once allocated, 
whilst durable flexibility-increasing procedures 
are not restricted in use. 
(iii) the rapidity by which management can 
implement its procedures; management may 
possess the right procedures, but this does not 
necessarily mean that it can implement hese 
procedures in time (see Fig. 5). Flexibility is not 
a static condition, but a dynamic process. Time 
is an essential factor of organizational f exi- 
bility. However, a short comment must be given 
on the appreciation of speed in popular 
management beliefs. For instance, in a popular 
article in Fortune, Dumaine [19] describes how 
management can succeed through speed. Too 
short a reaction time, however, may lead to 
overreaction and excessive information search- 
ing and finally result in chaos. From the theory 
of control we know that the Controlling Organ 
should take account of the lead time of the 
Target System: a feedback that is too fast leads 
to instability and eventually to the explosion of 
the system. Therefore, the management some- 
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times has to act prudently instead of decisively 
in that it must wait until the impact has reached 
a certain threshold level (increase of retardation 
time) or slowly and continuously implement 
change (increase of response time). In the case 
of prudent management, the mean acceleration 
of the process of change is reduced. Thus, 
rapidity of implementation is a function of the 
required time and the acceleration of the process 
of change. 
The organization design task 
Nonetheless, there are some limitations to the 
control capability of the management. The 
management's ability to initiate flexibility-in- 
creasing procedures i dependent upon certain 
organizational conditions, such as the organiz- 
ation's technology, structure and culture. These 
determine the volume and composition of the 
collection of flexibility-increasing procedures. 
This is in line with De Leeuw's [15] "Law of 
Managerial Busyness", which demonstrates a 
decreasing control performance as soon as 
control efforts are increased above a certain 
critical evel. As is depicted in Fig. 6, the relation 
between the use of the control capal~ility of the 
management and the controllability of the 
organization roughly resembles a parabola. In 
accordance with this law, when the management 
tries to increase the collection of flexibility-in- 
creasing procedures beyond its limits, the result 
is that the controllability of the organization 
diminishes further and further. 
The controllability or the absolute boundary 
of potential flexibility inherent in an existing 
organization depends on the design adequacy of 
the organization [59]. Design adequacy is a 
measure of the probability that the organiz- 
ation's technology, structure and culture are 
changeable within the time window required 
by the repertoire of flexibility-increasing 
procedures. Thus, the controllability of 
the organization determines the boundary 
conditions imposed on the collection of 
flexibility-increasing procedures. Therefore, an 
organization that has a surplus of flexibility- 
increasing procedures, that are all activated by 
the management, will experience chaos. Organ- 
izations sometimes have to vary their boundary 
of potential flexibility by changing the design 
parameters of the technology, structure or 
culture. 
On the one hand, this implies a possibility of 
enlarging flexibility by changing (i.e. widening) 
the organizational conditions. This corresponds 
with Galbraith's [20] design strategy of creating 
organizational s ack. The extreme consequence 
of this strategy for improving flexibility is an 
organization with organizational conditions o 
loose that it becomes nonexistent: all possible 
states are considered satisfactory. We then have 
flexibility by the grace of the absence of an 
identity or mission stemming from the organiz- 
ational culture, a structure characteristic of the 
organization, or a distinct echnology. It may be 
clear that this is no flexibility at all. No control 
action is needed any more because the 
organization is happy, irrespective of the 
present state. Compare the person that holds all 
opinions, even conflicting ones, depending on 
the direction of environmental pressures. One 
then concludes that this person has no opinion 
at all. On the other hand, an organization is 
flexible when the minimum of controllability 
contr~Oal~my 
of the 
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and control capability is high, especially in the 
case of tight organizational conditions. In the 
latter case, a small set of desired states can be 
reached notwithstanding disturbances. The 
essence is that the change is restricted: not 
everything is changeable. 
This amounts to the insight that flexibility is 
linked to tenacity with respect to organizational 
conditions as well as to their adaptability [50]. 
The concept of flexibility is not only opposite to 
but even impossible without preservation. This 
apparent contradiction is very important for 
understanding flexibility. The notion of preser- 
vation leads to the consideration of the second 
dimension of flexibility, namely the organiz- 
ation design task [21]. This task involves 
creating the appropriate organizational con- 
ditions necessary to effectively realize certain 
flexibility-increasing procedures. They thereby 
guarantee 'preservation' for the organization 
and some 'stability' for its participants. These 
frequently neglected aspects are indispensable 
elements for the realization of flexibility [51]. 
Just as there can be no differentiation without 
integration [29], similarly, there can be no 
flexibility without some stability or preservation 
[5]. Stability provides certainty for organiz- 
ational members and preservation facilitates 
controllability of the organization. Certainty 
refers to situations in which organizational 
participants have enough possibilities of pre- 
serving their identity. If there are not enough 
possibilities, participants will lose their identity. 
Both controllability of the organization and 
certainty for organizational participants define 
the limits of various types of flexibility. 
The paradox of flexibility 
A controll'~ble form of flexibility requires 
some preservation regarding organizational 
conditions; at the same this preservation defines 
the boundaries and limits of the collection of 
flexibility-increasing procedures. Thus, our 
two-dimensional conception of flexibility creates 
a paradox: an organization must possess ome 
procedures which enhance its flexibility in order 
to avoid becoming rigid, but it must also be 
anchored in some way in order to avoid chaos. 
Rather than accepting the dichotomy of 
preservation and change, this paradox implies 
that organizational flexibility incorporates both 
change and preservation. Consequently, man- 
agement has to deal with a constructive t nsion 
[25] between that which must be changed and 
that which it is necessary to preserve; a tension, 
for example, between the need for managers to 
question and challenge versus the preservation of
core values and organizational mission; between 
the need for new ideas and directions and the 
need for continuity and preservation of core 
technologies [24]. Or, as Ulrich and Lake [49, 
p. 245] formulate it, the flexible organization 
asks for a willingness to shift, flex and change, 
and at the same time for an unconditional com- 
mitment, concern, and loyalty to the organiz- 
ation. As we have stated above, this preservation 
or anchoring can be a result of various dimen- 
sions of the organizational culture, the organiz- 
ational structure, or the operational technology. 
RECONSIDERING THE MANAGEMENT AND 
ORGANIZATION DESIGN TASKS OF 
FLEXIBILITY: THE SECOND ROUND OF 
THE COTS GAME 
The systems theory of control has resulted in 
a systematic and multidimensional definition of 
organizational flexibility. In the second round of 
the COTS game we will further elaborate the 
two configurations as discussed above. In 
particular, their management and organization 
design tasks concerning flexibility are con- 
sidered. It is our argument hat such explo- 
rations contribute to insights which support our 
definition of flexibility. 
The management and organization design tasks 
within a controlled organization for improving 
adaptability 
In the case of a controlled organization (see 
Fig. 7), the organization is considered as a 
system (TS) steered by its environment (CO). In 
the first half of the game, we described flexibility 
in this context as being insensitive to environ- 
mental influences. A further examination 
teaches us that we have two alternatives: 
insensitivity together with a total absence of 
control activity within the organization, and 
insensitivity that is the result of effective control 
reactions for compensating environmental influ- 
ences. 
The first alternative might certainly be useful 
for organizations. One could think of a 
monopolist producing oods or services that are 
indispensable tothe environment. In such a case 
the organization is unassailable because of the 
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low control capability of the environment. 
Nevertheless, it does not seem to be natural to 
speak of flexibility in this case. The second 
alternative, however, does correspond with 
flexibility. In this case, disturbances are fought 
against effectively by alert adaptations (or, more 
broadly, changes) without the organization 
losing its distinctiveness. Consequently, the 
organization creates a degree of autonomy from 
environmental impacts by adapting in such a 
way that it largely remains itself. In order to 
examine the management and organization 
design tasks for this configuration we have to 
study the organization at a lower level of 
aggregation. This lowering of the level of 
aggregation is also called reticulation in the 
systems theory of control. As depicted in Fig. 7, 
reticulation of the organization as a TS results 
in a configuration of a CO and a TS in an 
environment. Using the insights from the 
systems theory of control as developed above, 
we may conclude that insensitivity to environ- 
mental disturbances is produced by high 
controllability of the TS (in the organization; 
mind the reticulation!) and sufficient control 
capability of the CO. 
In this context, the management task involves 
increasing the capacity to adapt to changes in 
the environment. Management can improve this 
capacity by activating flexibility-increasing pro- 
cedures directed at change within the organiz- 
ation itself. This internal type of flexibility goes 
in tandem with changes in routines, structures 
and even goals of the organization. Nonetheless, 
management will only allow local or peripheral 
adaptations and will try as long as possible to 
retain a handful of central values. In other 
words, management must have sufficient com- 
petencies in terms of tenacity and willingness to 
adapt goals. 
In order to assure that the environment 
cannot prevent he organization from going its 
way (it has a low controllability from the 
environment), the organization must be per- 
fectly controllable for the management. The 
organization design task therefore involves the 
creation of organizational conditions which 
enhance the above described adaptability and 
preserve the core identity of the organization. 
From the theory of complexity, Simon's [44] 
concept of the viable system is immediately 
applicable. These organizations have near- 
decomposability properties and are arranged in 
a hierarchical way. The hierarchical structure 
implies that such organizations consist of 
subsystems which in turn consist of sub-subsys- 
tems, and so on. Near-decomposability means 
that the relations within the subsystems are 
stronger than those between the subsystems. 
The short-term behaviour of such subsystems is 
determined by the stronger internal relations, 
while the long-term behaviour of the system as 
a whole is mainly determined by the weaker 
interrelations between the subsystems. The 
hierarchical composition of relatively auton- 
omous subsystems, or, in Weick's terms [56], 
loosely-coupled systems, possesses some unique 
properties of stability. In contrast with an 
unstable equilibrium, which is destroyed by 
every disturbance, Ashby [8] distinguishes three 
types of stability: 
(i) monostability, which refers to an organiz- 
ation in which a certain position can be 
maintained in spite of certain disturbances; as 
long as the disturbances are not too large, this 
position can be restored. In other words, the 
organization is capable of keeping the essential 
variables within certain boundaries (homeo- 
static); 
(ii) ultrastability, which stands for a higher 
form of stability; ultrastable organizations can 
reach totally different positions of equilibrium 
whenever circumstances change radically; 
(iii) multistability, which refers to a character- 
istic enabling an organization to adapt locally in 
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an ultrastable way to simultaneous and different 
disturbances. 
Applying Ashby's stability concepts, we can 
subscribe ultra-stability properties to the sub- 
systems in such a way that the system as a whole 
is multi-stable [17]. The last type of stability, 
which includes the first two, enables the 
organization to realize effective independent 
reactions which keep disturbances local (adap- 
tability). It reduces the necessity for large-scale 
change but also makes it more difficult to 
achieve change when it is needed (preservation). 
This means that, in organizations designed 
according to these principles, disturbances are 
likely to be localized in their effects, with the 
activities of a system as a whole reflecting a 
great degree of persistence and stability in the 
face of changing circumstances. 
Thus, in the case of a controlled system, the 
management task involves the activation of 
internal flexibility. Consequently, the environ- 
ment has no hand in these organizations, not 
because they do not undergo influences but 
because they have great capacities to adapt. 
Furthermore, the organization design task 
involves creating a hierarchical composition of 
subsystems to facilitate the organization's 
adaptability, and also to preserve its core 
identity. 
One more aspect has to be mentioned here, 
namely the fact that flexibility is related to 
various levels of aggregation [28]. From the 
above configuration, it is clear that flexibility at 
the level of the subsystems is needed to manage 
their internal relations. Consequently, the 
system as a whole is highly insensitive to local 
environmental disturbances. On the other hand, 
the system also needs another type of flexibility 
with respect o the weak interrelations between 
the subsystems. This latter type of flexibility is 
often centralized and involves the preservation 
of a handful of central values and the 
adaptation of peripheral values. 
constructing its environment along with its own 
identity. It dominates the environment in order 
to preserve its identity. But some identities are 
likely to be more robust and enduring than 
others. As organizations assert heir identities, 
they can initiate major transformations in their 
environment. Consequently, they can create the 
conditions that will allow them to evolve along 
with the environment or set the basis for their 
own destruction. 
As portrayed in Fig. 8, domination over the 
environment requires high controllability of the 
environment and sufficient control capability of 
the organization. In this context, the manage- 
ment task involves enhancing the capacity to 
influence the environment. The management 
can increase this capacity by activating the 
flexibility-increasing procedures directed at 
change in the environment. This external type of 
flexibility sometimes goes together with changes 
in structures or goals of the environment. For 
instance, horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
reflect managerial attempts to control competi- 
tive uncertainties through adjusting industrial 
structure [37, 38]. Vertical integration as an 
attempt o control input or demand uncertain- 
ties is also an example of external structural 
change [37, 58]. Finally, influencing consumers 
through advertising and promotions may even 
lead to changes in the goals of the environment 
[31]. 
In order to enable the organization to 
dominate its environment, this environment 
must be perfectly controllable from the organiz- 
ation. Of course, this is seldom the case. The 
organization design task therefore involves the 
organizing of the environment in such a way 
that it can be dominated by the organization. 
Just as we had to decompose the organization 
in the case of a controlled organization, in this 
organiTation 
(CO) 
The management and organization design task 
within an autonomous organization for improving 
dominance 
In the case of an autonomous organization 
(see Fig. 8), the organization is thought of as an 
organ (CO) that controls its environment (TS). 
It is seen as playing an active role in 
environment 
(TS) 
Fig. 8. The organization as an autonomous ystem. 
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configuration we have to decompose the 
environment into relatively autonomous ub- 
markets. In the literature of strategic marketing, 
we find many segmentation strategies aimed at 
successfully accomplishing such a decompo- 
sition (cf. [1, p. 51]). 
Furthermore, by projecting itself onto its 
environment and thereby organizing its environ- 
ment, an organization sets the basis for acting 
in relation to that environment in a way that 
actually allows it to produce itself; in other 
words, the self-referential capabilities of auton- 
omous systems enable them to engage in various 
structural relationships with their environment. 
In Cybernetics II this is called structural 
coupling. These networks of relations enable the 
organization to constantly recreate the con- 
ditions necessary to sustain it. These relation- 
ships preserve the organization's identitylk 
While preservation ofan identity is fundamental 
for the autonomous organization, there are 
different ways in which closure in relation to the 
environment can be achieved. In this context, 
we must keep in mind that the environment is 
not an independent domain, but a part of the 
organization because it is part of its domain of 
essential interaction. As Maruyama [30] ex- 
presses it, there is no longer room for parasitic 
relationships, where what one gains is another's 
loss, nor for antibiotic relations, where one, out 
of self-interest, actively harms the other. 
Instead, the organization has to create con- 
ditions that will allow it to evolve along with the 
environment. Organizations that only try to 
preserve their own fixed and narrowly defined 
identity may end up trying to sustain unrealistic 
identities, or ultimately destroying the contexts 
of which they are a part [36, p. 245]. An 
appreciation of the system's interdependence 
with suppliers, markets, labour force and other 
entities facilitates more symbiotic relationships. 
For example, one might think of long-term 
contractual agreements with suppliers or 
buyers, alliances or joint ventures, franchising 
agreements or technology licensing agreements. 
"Smith [46, pp. 287-288] distinguishes three patterns of 
interaction, amely (1) communication, in which total 
autonomy of the entities i maintained, (2)fusion, in 
which autonomy ofthe entities i surrendered ntirely so 
that the superordinate system will be maximally 
autonomous, and (3) symbiosis, in which each entity 
loses ome autonomy in order to create an autonomous 
superordinate system. 
Thus, in the case of an autonomous system, 
the management task involves the activation of 
external flexibility. Consequently, the organiz- 
ation can dominate the environment by 
producing directed influence. For this manage- 
ment task to succeed, the organization design 
task requires decomposition of the environ- 
ment, and facilitating structural coupling with 
that environment in such a way that the 
organization's identity can be preserved and 
evolve along with that environment. 
From the above configuration, it is once again 
clear that flexibility is related to various levels of 
aggregation. For instance, external flexibility is 
required to manage individual markets, but a 
higher level of external flexibility is required to 
manage the weak interrelations between mar- 
kets. The former type of external flexibility is 
often decentralized, while the latter is often 
centralized within the organization. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have sought to improve 
understanding of what the word flexibility might 
mean when applied to an organization. The 
notion of control was explored and led us to the 
idea of dual control, in which the organization 
is viewed as a controlled system and as an 
autonomous system. In the one case, flexibility 
is the organization being controlled by the 
environment, in the other the organization 
controls the environment. Four types of 
flexibility were identified, internal and external, 
each passive or active. Our discussion of the 
implications of these insights for organizational 
effectiveness and viability lead us to our 
multidimensional definition of organizational 
flexibility. 
The management and organization design 
tasks, if flexibility is desired, were developed for 
different control configurations of the organiz- 
ation in relation to its environment. Of course, 
we can carry out the same exercise at higher or 
lower levels of aggregation, for instance, 
considering a subsystem in relation to the whole 
system with respect o flexibility. Still, it is true 
for every level of consideration, that a system's 
flexibility requires both adaptability and domi- 
nance if the system's identity is to be preserved 
and allowed to evolve along with that of the 
wider system. The paradoxical conclusion is 
that flexibility must not be seen as the opposite 
138 De Leeuw, VolberdaIDual Control Perspective 
of stability but as a requirement of a higher 
order of stability: no flexibility without preser- 
vation. 
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